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Supreme Court Review
LAW REFORM AND THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE
By EMMETT M. HALL*
The subject upon which I was invited to deal with, "Law Reform and
the Judiciary's Role" is, I am sure, an intriguing one to all students of the
law, to law teachers and to academics generally. I must confess to a certain
apprehension in speaking to you today. I run the risk that because I happen
to be a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, whatever I say may be inter-
preted or understood to reflect the thinking of the Court. I have no right to
speak for the Court - no one judge has that right - and what I say is
personal to me alone. Please be good enough to accord me this freedom.
In preparation for today, I did considerable reading and very little of
what I say can be called "original". There is a considerable volume of litera-
ture on the subject and I have drawn in particular on my friends Roger
Traynor, retired Chief Justice of California, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, M.P.,
Mr. Justice Laskin and others; a species of plagiarism if you will, but ex-
cellent source material.
The subject is one on which opinions may be somewhat fixed. I don't
expect to change anyone's opinion, not to the extent in any event as
happened in a case some time ago when a woman was called for jury duty
and she refused to serve because she said she did not believe in capital
punishment. Trying to persuade her, the judge explained: "This is merely a
civil case in which a wife is suing her husband because she gave him $1,000
to make the down payment for her on a mink coat and he lost the money in
a poker game." "I will serve" she said, "I could be wrong about capital
punishment."
Judges may be said to be men who think well of themselves. This was
illustrated when Queen Victoria was to attend the opening of the Royal
Courts of Justice in 1882. Lord Selborne, the Lord Chancellor, called a
meeting of the judges at which the draft of an address to the Queen was
being prepared. As submitted, it contained the phrase: "Your Majesty's
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Judges are deeply sensible of their own many shortcomings .. ." He got no
further. Jessel, M. R. took strong objection, saying, "I am not conscious of
'many shortcomings' and if I were I should not be fit to sit on the bench."
Following a heated exchange, Bowen L. J. suggested a characteristic com-
promise: "Instead of saying that we are 'deeply sensible of our many short-
comings', why not say that we are 'deeply sensible of the many shortcomings
of each other' "?
We judges are sensible of the shortcomings of each other and of our
own. It cannot be otherwise. We are reminded of our limitations from time
to time by articles in various reviews and elsewhere - so we remain humble
to that degree.
In any discussion of reform in Canada by the judiciary, it has to be
recognized at the outset that the Canadian situation differs from that of the
United States, with its constitutional guarantees, and from that of the United
Kingdom where the highest judicial body, the House of Lords, is also a
legislative body with Parliament at Westminster answerable only to the
electorate for its actions. There is no one in Canada with the power to say
as Lord Gardiner did in his capacity as Lord Chancellor on July 26, 1966:
Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation
upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It
provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in
the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal
rules.
Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to prece-
dent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the future
development of the law. They propose therefore to modify their present practice
and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart
from a previous decision when it appears right to do so.
In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retro-
spectively the basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrange-
ments have been entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the
criminal law.
This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere
than in this House.'
That was a policy statement much the same as the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council had made on occasions in judgments in less dramatic
form based on the premise that the Committee was not in law a court but
merely advised the Sovereign. A careful -reading of Lord Gardiner's state-
ment will show that he was not discarding precedent very substantially but
was opening the door somewhat to a less rigid application of the binding
effect of precedent.
In a reference to Lord Gardiner's statement in terms of its effect in
Canada, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, M.P. has said: "The end of stare decisis in
its rigid form in Canada is more revolutionary in appearance than in reality,
for in large part, both in Canada and in England it has been a protective
screen behind which judges legislated in silence and in secrecy."
I Vol. 276, Parliamentary Debates-House of Lords 1966-67, at 677.
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Any discussion of the role of the Judiciary in law reform necessarily
involves a consideration of the use of stare decisis. The view a judge takes
of stare decisis will colour and condition that judge's opinion on the right
and obligation to follow precedent or to depart from precedent in any given
circumstances or, put another way, to attempt reform or to leave that func-
tion to the Legislature.
No one suggests that decided cases ought not to be studied and great
consideration given to their persuasive value. There is a fundamental differ-
ence between being influenced or persuaded by the reasoning and logic of a
prior decision and being bound to follow that decision as a matter of law.
In the latter situation it is not the intellectual force of the decision which
persuades or even compels acceptance, but it is the rule of law that says
the decision must be followed even if repugnant, outdated, or just plainly
wrong.
The discussion must also recognize the hierarchy of judicial authority
within any given jurisdiction. So in Canada we must be aware of the Courts
of Appeal or Appellate Divisions in each of the provinces and territories and
of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada as the final Court of
Appeal for all of Canada in civil and criminal matters. This necessarily in-
volves us in a discussion of what respect one provincial court of appeal
should have for the judgments of the other provincial Courts of Appeal and
also the extent to which trial courts are or should be bound to follow: (a)
the decisions of their own appellate court; and (b) the decisions of appeal
courts of other provinces.
The limitations of time available today make anything like a complete
review of the subject an impossibility so I must of necessity deal specifically
with the role of the Supreme Court of Canada as the apex of the judicial
hierarchy in Canada, leaving it to you to apply mutatis mutandis what I may
say to the trial and appeal courts at the provincial level.
Shortly after 1949 when the Supreme Court of Canada became the
final Court of Appeal, the Court began to move away from a rigid applica-
tion of stare decisis.
Before 1950 the Supreme Court of Canada was bound to follow the
decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council though that august
body was not so bound. Vide Robins v. National Trust Company.2
However, Rinfret C.J.C. in Re Storgoff,3 in dissent, held that the aboli-
tion of appeals to the Privy Council abrogated the binding authority of House
of Lords and Privy Council decisions in the criminal law area.
With respect to the binding effect of its own decisions, the Supreme
Court of Canada had in 1909 laid down a stringent rule of stare decisis in
Stuart v. Bank of Montreal.4
2 [19271 A.C. 515, [1927] 2 D.L.R. 97.
8 [1945] S.C.R. 526, [1945] 3 D.LR. 673, 84 C.C.C.1.
4 (1909), 41 S.C.R. 516.
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Mr. Justice Duff said: "Considerations of public convenience too obvious
to require statement ... make it our duty to apply (stare decisis) ... to the
decisions of this Court."5
Mr. Justice Anglin said: "Whether it be regarded as final or inter-
mediate, ... the attitude of this court towards its previous decisions upon
questions of law should, in my opinion, be the same."6
Fleming v. Atkinson7 is a turning point in the aftermath of the abolition
of appeals to the Privy Council.
Then in R. v. George8 Cartwright J. (dissenting) said of stare decisis in
the Supreme Court:
I do not propose to enter on the question, which since 1949 has been raised from
time to time by authors, whether this Court now that it has become the final
Court of Appeal for Canada is, as in the case of the House of Lords, bound by
its own previous decisions on questions of law, or whether, as in the case of the
Judicial Committee or the Supreme Court of the United States, it is free under
certain circumstances to reconsider them.9
Less than a year after George, Cartwright J., delivering the judgment of
himself, Ritchie and Spence J.J. said in Binus v. The Queen.10
I do not doubt the power of this Court to depart from a previous judgment of
its own but, where the earlier decision has not been made per incuriam, and
especially in cases in which Parliament or the Legislature is free to alter the law
on the point decided, I think that such a departure should be made only for
compelling reasons.11
The attitude of the Supreme Court toward the treatment of its decisions
in provincial courts has been unambiguously stated by Rinfret C.J.C. speak-
ing for the Court in Woods Manufacturing Co. v. The King.12
Nothing is more important than that the law as pronounced, including the inter-
pretation by this Court of the decisions of the Judicial Committee, should be
accepted and applied as our tradition requires; and even at the risk of that falli-
bility to which all judges are liable, we must maintain the complete integrity of
relationship between the courts. If the rules in question are to be accorded any
further examination or review, it must come from either this Court or from the
Judicial Committee.13
The last mentioned quote represented the holding of Davey J.A. in
A. G. of Canada v. Nykorak."4
5 Id. at 535.
G Id. at 548.
7 [1959] S.C.R. 513, 18 D.L.R. (2d) 81.
8 [1966] S.C.R. 267, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386.0 Id. at 278, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386 at 395.
10 [1967] S.C.R. 594, 2 C.R.N.S. 118.
1id. at 601, 2 C.R.N.S. at 119.
12 [1951] S.C.R. 504, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 465.
13 Id. at 515, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 465 at 475.
14 (1961) 28 D.L.R. (2d) 485.
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It is pertinent also to recall Rand J.'s statement in Reference re The
Farm Products Marketing Act,'5 where he said:
The powers of this Court in the- exercise of its jurisdiction are no less in scope
than those formerly exercised in relation to Canada by the Judicial Committee.
From time to time the Committee has modified the language used by it in the
attribution of legislation to the various heads of ss. 91 and 92, and in its general
interpretative formulations, and that incident of judicial power must, now, in the
same manner and with the same authority, wherever deemed necessary, be
exercised in revising or restating those formulations that have come down to us.
This is a function inseparable from constitutional decision. It involves no depar-
ture from the basic principles of jurisdictional distribution; it is rather a refine-
ment of interpretation in application to the particularized and evolving features
and aspects of matters which the intensive and extensive expansion of the life of
the country inevitable presents.16
when dealing specifically with the British North America Act.
So much for stare decisis. It is not now open to question that the Su-
preme Court of Canada is not now bound rigidly by this doctrine and the
way is open to depart from previous decisions. The real issue is the advisa-
bility of so doing and the extent to which it should be done. The way is
open: should it be used? This brings us to an academic or philosophical
consideration of the question.
Although it is clothed in terms to reflect the current vogue, I am not
unaware that the question-the role of the judiciary in law reform-is one of
the oldest, most controversial and most fundamental ones about the judicial
process. But it is appropriate in an era in which all systems are tested and
all assumptions are challenged that we continue to struggle with this question,
which indeed is never answered for all times.
The question could be variously phrased: do judges make law or merely
apply it, should judges pursue a policy of judicial activism, which of course
can be either a liberal or conservative posture, or should they pursue a policy
of judicial restraint? Is judicial law-making legislative usurpation, or put
most simply, what is the function of the judiciary in a modem democratic
state? However phrased, the question is likely to test the symbolic strength
of our notion of "government of laws and not men" and all the evocations
which that phrase raises.
It is often said: legislative power is vested in Parliament, judicial power
is vested in the courts; it is for the legislature to make law, it is for the
courts to say what the law is, the verb "is" assuming the law's prior existence.
Well, of course, it is incorrect to so pose the question if one expects to en-
gage in an intelligent discussion of the court's function. It is wrong because
the question assumes that legislative power is the antithesis of judicial power
when in reality those words cannot be defined with enough precision to make
them in all cases, or even perhaps in a majority of cases, distinguishable.
By simply labelling processes and then repeating the labels we do not make
a clear separation between those processes. I would suggest that there is
11 "19571 S.C.R. 198, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 257.
16Id. at 212-3, 7 D.LR. (2d) 257 at 271-2.
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most often only a difference of degree but not of kind between making the
law and applying it.
Admitting then we are not discussing absolutes, but only a vague con-
cept about the methods used by an institution to reach a decision, I am sur-
prised at the seriousness of the debate that still erupts between scholars and
practitioners over not only whether judges should contribute to the evolution
of law but also whether they actually do. Of course we do, and that should
be clear to all. I can tell you that the judiciary does contribute to changing
the law because I have participated in making changes in such cases as
Cahoon v. Franks'7, Pich v. The Queen,'8 and Ares v. Venner,'9 to name
some.
Lord Radcliffe, who struggled mercilessly with himself all his life with
the role of the judge in law reform, had this to say in an address deliveredjust after he retired from the Bench, ".... there was never a more sterile
controversy than that upon the question whether a judge makes law. Of
course he does. How can he help?" And then he went on to say, and this is
a point I will come back to: "The legislature and the judicial process respec-
tively are two complementary sources of law-making, and in a well ordered
state each has to understand its respective functions and limitations."
Three years later, in 1967, at a lecture delivered at Harvard University,
he restated his view:
I do not believe that it was ever an important discovery that judges are in some
sense lawmakers. It is much more important to analyse the relative truth of an
idea so far-reaching; because unless the analysis is strict and its limitations ob-
served, there is real danger in its elaboration. 20
So I would urge upon you that whether the judiciary makes law, as that
term is used in ordinary language, should no longer be a matter of serious
debate. In the Civil Law, at least since Geny published in 1899 his magni-
ficent Mthode, it is hardly disputable that even the judicial interpretation
of the Code Civil, far from being predominantly analytical, has been immen-
sely creative.
The difficult and essential question is not whether judges do or even
should make law, but rather, in the seventies, in a democratic Canadian
society, what are the limits of the role of the judiciary in law reform, parti-
cularly in this day when law reform commissions abound, and will the essen-
tial function that the Court performs in our society be strengthened or weak-
ened by increasing its law-making power? This is a question about which
reasonable men may differ.
You have often heard judges say in the course of their judgment, "This
is a matter for the legislatures, not for the courts". For what reasons does a
'T [1967] S.C.R. 455, 63 D.L.R. (2d) 274.
18 [1971] S.C.R. 23, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 701.
10 [1970] S.C.R. 608, 73 W.W.R. 347, rev'g 70 W.W.R. 96.
20 Lord Radcliffe, "The Lawyer and his Times", in The Path of the Law From
1967, ed. Arthur E. Sutherland (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Law School,
1968) at 14.
[VOL. 10, NO. 2
Law Reform
judge reach that conclusion? On what grounds does a judge decide that an
issue raised in the controversy before him cannot be decided in one way
by him because it is a question of policy more fit for legislative resolution?
I cannot give you a definitive answer to that question; indeed there is so
much to say about the role of the judiciary in law reform that it is difficult
to know where to begin. What I wish to do, however, is to address myself
to the question impressionistically, leaving you, I hope, with some sense of
the urgency of the question and its magnitude.
Initially, I will discuss the implications of holding that judges do not
make law at all, but simply mechanically apply pre-existing rules; then I will
assert that the legislature and the courts are co-partners in law-making and
that an intelligent discussion of their respective roles ought to begin with
that assumption; thirdly, I will briefly discuss the three possible forms of
judicial law-making, the common law, statutory interpretation, and consti-
tutional law; then finally I will discuss some of the institutional characteristics
of the courts which define and limit their role in law reform.
There is a view widely accepted by the bench and bar in Canada that
the judge must not, in reaching his decision, take into consideration political
and social issues or public policy and opinion. Those who hold that view
argue that the bench, in reaching its decision, must use only traditional legal
techniques.
Their appeal to authority is unimpressive. Traditionally the common
law grew and became a civilizing force in our society only because it con-
sidered social, political and economic facts. Indeed, every rule of law is
simply an earlier court's decision about how competing interests and values
ought to be reconciled.
So if a court now accepts the argument that it should not consider eco-
nomic and political facts in reaching its decision, and thus treats legal ques-
tions as if today's society does not exist, it is only deluding itself in thinking
it is not being political; what it is doing is basing its legal analysis upon rules
that were formulated and might reflect an age of a very different social, eco-
nomic and political philosophy. While it is true that the Court might not be
inroducing today's politics into today's law, what it does, by ignoring social
and economic facts, and this is the ineluctable reality of such a posture, is
introduce yesterday's politics into today's law. It is like trying to solve con-
sciousness m problems with consciousness I assumptions, if you will pardon
the allusion.
To suggest that judges should not consider societal facts also ignores
the very ends that law seeks to serve in our society. There may have been a
time, and Roscoe Pound has suggested there was, when the function of law
was to preserve peace and, later, to keep the status quo; at such a time the
symbol of law as certain and unchanging was appropriate to its function.
Pound suggested, however, that now the function of law is the maximum
satisfaction of human wants. If we accept that assumption, that law is now
essentially concerned with the reconciliation of competing interests and
values, and I rather suspect it always has been, then in an era in which
change is so overwhelming, when society's interests and values are changing
19721
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so rapidly that we stand in the danger of being subjected to "cultural shock",
a device to reconcile those values which remains static and timeless is in-
congruous. Laws are obeyed not because they symbolize absolute certainty,
or because they symbolize a body of men sitting and mechanically applying a
body of fixed rule, but because they reflect the better aspirations and values
of the community.
I find it hard to believe that the public will cease to believe in the
fairness and probity of the courts if the Courts lay down new laws from
time to time. Indeed, if anything, faith in the courts will increase; faith, that
is, in the day-to-day dispensation of justice. Thus to take all social and eco-
nomic factors into account in a definition of the rule of law is not only per-
missible but indispensable.
Those who oppose the notion that the law courts should take an active
part in the adaptation of the law to social problems usually argue that to do
so would sacrifice certainty, the primary virtue of the law. Unquestionably,
to be an effective instrument of social control, the law must be certain so
that people can foresee the consequences of their acts. However, it is an illu-
sion that the law gains certainty when judges engage in mechanical appli-
cation of so-called prior existing rules of law; and also, of course, the need
for certainty, predictability and stability must be reconciled with the need for
continuing social change. Continual change in legal rules is inevitable. If the
purpose of the law is to achieve the best possible balancing and adjustment of
the diverse interests in society, then the value of certainty ought to be weighed
in the balance along with all the other competing values. I see no reason why
certainty should be an absolute value, as if people valued only certainty, and
indeed if we remove the talismanic aura from the concept I believe often it
would not even weigh heavily in the balancing of interests.
It helps, I think, in understanding the role of the judiciary in law reform
if we begin with the assumption that in the final analysis both the courts and
the legislature are pursuing the same ultimate goal - the common good of
the people - which means, at a slightly lower level of abstraction, human
dignity and individual freedom for all.
Defining law as an instrument of government, Lord Wright has written,
Law is not an end in itself. It is a part in the system of government of the nation
in which it functions, and it has to justify itself by its ability to subserve the
ends of government, that is, to help to promote the ordered existence of the
nation; and the good life of the people.
I think it is useful in discussing the role of the judiciary in law reform to
distinguish the three possible areas or judicial law-making: deciding a case
according to the common law, statutory interpretation, and constitutional
interpretation, because the considerations for judicial law reform are different
for each of these areas.
In our legal system the phrase "the Common Law" is most commonly
used to refer to judge-made law as distinguished from statute law. I think
everyone would agree that our whole legal heritage derives from the common
law which originated at a time when the courts were the prime law-makers.
Everyone that is except those who would cling to the ancient Blackstonian
[VOL. 10, NO. 2
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fiction that the rules applied in the early decisions were not made by the
judges but were merely derived from custom discovered and declared. Thus
by definition the common law deals with problems which have not been
resolved by legislative action. It would seem incongruous then if the courts,
having in the first instance made the law, did not assume a share of the
responsibility for reforming it.
Some judges, however, feel that they cannot undertake law reform
because they are bound by precedent, and that precedent is sufficient justi-
fication for deciding a case in a certain way. This theory of jurisprudence
has been variously called, primarily by its critics, "legal fundamentalism",
"formalism", "the phonographic theory of law", "mechanical jurisprudence".
As Lord Denning has said, "to such judges the doctrine of stare decisis
means: 'Stand by your decisions and the decisions of your predecessors,
however wrong they are and whatever injustice they inflict."'
There are at least three reasons why such a theory of the judicial pro-
cess is inadequate: firstly, the number of fact-combinations that may occur
is infinte, indeed no two cases can be identical; secondly, once we admit that
we can overrule our own previous decisions, then we must admit that at
least in some instances we use a different method of reasoning to justify a
conclusion; and thirdly and most importantly, our society is constantly pro-
ducing new problems, new needs, and new community attitudes and values.
Cases decided at a time when such needs and values did not exist cannot pos-
sibly apply to solve these new problems. Indeed it is almost certain that the
common law would no longer exist if great judges had not, from time to time,
accepted the challenge and boldly laid down new principles to meet new
social problems.
The rationale of using precedents to intelligently solve legal problems
is not to apply them mechanically and thus relieve the judge of any social
responsibility in reaching his decisions, but rather it is at once more com-
plex and more pragmatic.
An overwhelming proportion of decided cases, however, no longer deal
with the common law, they are concerned with statute law. The extent to
which the judiciary will engage in law reform in interpreting statutes will, of
course, depend upon the method of interpretation they use.
It is true, as attested by Pollock, that English judges, and I need hardly
add, Canadian judges, have often tended to interpret statutes "on the theory
that Parliament generally changes the law for the worse and that the business
of the judge is to keep the mischief of its interference within the narrowest
possible bounds." There are notable exceptions, of course, and most judges
do interpret statutes on the basis that the judicial function should be one of
active assistance in the progressive development of the law. But with the
proliferation of statutes the problems of judicial interpretation of statutory
language becomes more acute every year.
In Canada at least, the traditional manner of interpreting statutes is to
look at the meaning of the words to determine the intent of the legislature.
That approach has been subjected to at least two telling criticisms. Firstly,
1972]
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analytical linguists contend that words do not have meanings, but only uses;
and secondly, legal realists assert that there is nothing in reality which can be
identified as legislative intent. If those criticisms are valid, then what is the
function of the court in interpreting statutes?
The answer, I think, is clear if I am right that the courts and the legis-
latures are not competitive organs of government, but rather they have a
co-operative role to play in furthering the common good. The method of
statutory interpretation suggested by that statement is what has sometimes
been called the purposive approach. Perhaps the court's function should be
to search for the legislative purpose of a statute and then interpret the statute
to further that purpose.
This, of course, has implications for Canadian jurisprudence because
it means that if the purpose of the statute cannot be determined by reading
it through, then extrinsic aids such as legislative history must be resorted to.
Not only is the purposive method of interpretation the only realistic
way to use the legislative intent; it is the way in which legislators almost
certainly expect judges to behave. And so long as judges forward the broad
purposes of the legislation and not private opinions or policies of their own,
they are acting within limits of the judicial function.
In common law and statute law we have the supremacy of the legisla-
ture in the sense that the legislature can, by a simply majority, amend the
court's ways; in constitutional litigation this link is missing, and that fact, as
well as the generality of the language used in the Constitution, makes, I think
a fundamental difference in assessing the role of the judiciary in law reform
in constitutional cases. As Chief Justice Hughes of the United States Supreme
Court once said, "The Constitution is what the judges say it is." As we wit-
ness the great difficulty of our governments in agreeing on an amending
formula, let alone an amendment to our constitution, I am sure it is fair to
say that statement applies with equal force to Canada. Thus, in a very real
sense, the Court is the final arbiter in constitutional matters.
It is of vital importance then that if the Constitution is to remain a
living social and economic force, the Court's decisions cannot take on a
dogmatic or final form, and we cannot resort to the pretence that the constitu-
tion is devoid of, or remote from, political and social issues.
It is even more vital now that the Court has assumed a responsibility
for judicial review under the Bill of Rights that the day of conceptual juris-
prudence be over in the area of constitutional law. We can no longer speak
of constitutional interpretation as though it were entirely a matter of defining
words, discovering original intentions and identifying controlling precedents.
I have always believed that one of the court's vital roles in a demo-
cracy is to protect individuals and minorities. Democratic theory does not
always insist on the right of a majority immediately to effect its every desire.
And although, as we have seen in the United States, the court's legislative
power at the constitutional level can be fraught with danger, it may be the
only way yet devised for preventing the "tyranny of the majority", as Mill
termed it, for imposing on the minority.
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As I mentioned earlier, in the formative era of the common law the
judges virtually made the law. We are all familiar with Lord Coke and how
he created the mandamus jurisdiction of the King's Bench, Chief Justice Holt
who, at times, wrote in his opinions treatises on areas of the law, for instance,
the law of the bailor-bailee relationships in Coggs v. Bernard,21 and, of course,
Lord Mansfield whose creative faculty was legendary and who singlehanded
wrote the law of commercial practice and quasi-contract.
These were all great judges, and would unquestionably be great judges in
any age; however, on the other hand, at the time they sat on the bench there
was a peculiar opportunity and need for judicial law reform. It is clear from
the history of England that the pace of change was great in those times and
Parliament was unwilling to assume any responsibility for law reform, nor
was it equipped to. It did not have the large staff of well trained legal per-
sonnel it now has, nor had it developed the procedures necessary for com-
prehensive law reform. Of course the whole history of the common law has
been a constant give and take between consolidation and progress, between
legal technicians and the creative jurists, and I have often thought that a
social history of the law concentrating on those factors which may have in-
fluenced the judges of the time in assessing their role in law reform would
be of great interest.
I now wish to turn to some of the institutional characteristics of the
courts which define and limit their role in law reform. Rather than talking in
absolute, transcendental terms, this, it seems to me, is the proper manner in
which to define the court's role.
The adversary system, the method common law countries use to resolve
disputes between parties, imposes severe constraints upon policy formulation
by the courts and judicial law reform. The adversary system is a concept
which seems to invite unanalytical thinking, and in essence it embodies two
different principles: first, that the parties to a cause of action should be able
to define for themselves the content and theory of the controversy, and se-
cond, that the parties alone should investigate and carry forward the cause of
action. This means that the procedure of the court is admirably suited for
finding adjudicative facts concerning the parties to the controversy, who did
what, when, where and who, but ill-suited for finding legislative facts or facts
that do not immediately concern the parties but which may be vitally neces-
sary for policy-making.
The courts have attempted by numerous means to overcome this handi-
cap and to unearth the range of facts required for sound judgments on policy
questions. In some cases this has even meant going beyond the evidence and
materials brought before it by the immediate parties.
The Brandeis brief, so-named because it was Justice Brandeis when he
was at the bar who first used it, has often been suggested as a possible means
for the court to inform itself of economic and social facts.
It is simply a brief or factum to which is appended social and economic
data that the court may wish to utilize in reaching its decision. There are,
however, serious limitations on its use. If the economic or social facts which
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it presents are facts upon which the controversy might turn, then those facts
should unquestionably be adjudicated and put on the record, rather than
merely appended to a factum. An appellate court is not organized to try
issues of fact. A point that is sometimes overlooked is that Brandeis never
used his brief to prove the "truth" of a fact, rather he used it in cases in
which legislation was being challenged as infringing on "substantive due
process", that is, the legislation was an unreasonable infringement on freedom
of contract, and thus Brandeis merely cited the material to justify as rea-
sonable the legislation in question.
In one respect, however, the limitation on the courts' law-making power
imposed by the adversary system is its very strength, and renders it an ad-
mirable institution for law reform in some cases. In those cases in which the
decision does not involve the allocation of widely held and diffuse public
values and where the parties to the action represent all the interests that are
competing in the solution of the problem, the court, by focussing on the
concrete fact situation before it where the consequences of its holding can be
plainly seen is probably the best equipped institution to effect law reform.
A further problem of judicial law reform is that the court's decisions
act retroactively, and since the decision is reached in the context of a specific
controversy the court's holding governs the case before it. This may work
considerable hardship on a defendant who has relied on the old rule, and
also on any potential defendants against whom a cause of action has accrued.
It seems to me that in the end of any discussion about re-assessing the
role of the judiciary in law reform, we ought to come around to this question:
What place do we want the law courts to occupy in the Canadian society of
the future? Justice Holmes once remarked: "Behind every scheme to make
the world over lies the question, 'What kind of world do you want?"'
First, I think that we ought to admit, with candour that in the total
picture the role of the court in law reform will not be the major one. The
legislature, with the aid of the law reform commissions, must play the major
role.
Let me conclude by saying that the systematic re-examination and eva-
luation of our law with a view to improvement is essential, especially in an
age of sweeping social change. And it will be your responsibility as lawyers
to create and support institutions necessary to achieve that end, whether the
institutions be law reform commissions, law schools or the courts themselves.
If the appellate courts at a later time assume a more effective role in law
reform than they have in the past, it will be because of the law students of
today, and the legal education they acquire which stimulates them to study
and evaluate in a constructively critical way the key ideas of the legal system
and all of its principles and rules as the most effective way of achieving
justice between citizen and citizen and between government and the citizen.
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